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In the last fifteen years, several authors have suggested we conceive of self-
knowledge in terms of self-constitution. In developing this idea, most accounts 
rely on two presuppositions, one concerning the relation between the knowing 
subject and the mental states in question, and one concerning the importance of 
self-knowledge for human agency. In his Authority and Estrangement, for in-
stance, Richard Moran famously contends that knowledge of one’s own proposi-
tional attitudes is not merely an empirical matter, but involves a constitutive 
aspect. This, however, neither supports „a conventionalist reconstruction of 
first-person authority“ nor amounts to „a deflationary analysis of the claims of 
self-knowledge“ (Moran 2001, 26). Instead, Moran’s view preserves a robust 
notion of first-person authority, and provides us with a preliminary explanation 
of how the capacity for self-consciousness first makes it possible for a person to 
be responsible for his mental life and actions. 
Since the appearance of Authority and Estrangement, this view has been 
sharply criticized. Recently, however, it has been defended by Matthew Boyle, 
who points out some parallels between Moran’s and Kant’s approaches. Boyle 
claims that many problems raised in discussions about self-knowledge can be 
solved if one accepts a distinction between two kinds of self-knowledge similar 
to the Kantian opposition between self-knowledge through pure apperception 
and self-knowledge through inner sense. Boyle thus rejects what he calls „the 
Uniformity Assumption“; this is „the demand” underlying many approaches 
“that a satisfactory account of our self-knowledge should be fundamentally 
uniform, explaining all cases of ‘first-person authority’ in the same basic way“ 
(Boyle 2009, 141). And he suggests that in contrast to most theorists, Moran is 
not bound to the Uniformity Assumption, although he does consider our delib-
erative knowledge of our own attitudes to be fundamental.  
I am quite sympathetic to Boyle’s intention. It is indeed a widespread ten-
dency in philosophical discussions about self-knowledge to assume that the 
riddle of the (seeming or real) epistemic authority of the first person with re-
spect to knowledge of one’s own mental states can be solved by appealing to 
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one simple human capacity. And I agree with Boyle that this is a problematic 
presupposition. Furthermore, I share the view put forth by Boyle and Moran, as 
well as many others, that (roughly) Kantian approach may help us get a better 
understanding of the relation between self-knowledge or self-consciousness 
and self-constitution.1 
However, I am afraid that the way Kant is referred to in the defense of self-
constitutionalism may hide another important aspect of Kant’s views on self-
knowledge. There is a way in which, according to Kant, people passively be-
come aware of their mental life, including the thoughts they entertain. This is 
probably irrelevant for Kant’s primary epistemological project, which aims to 
clarify the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. But it is nonetheless an 
important ingredient in Kant’s overall outlook, insofar as it is a necessary condi-
tion for the possibility of enlightenment. That there is such a passive way of 
becoming aware of one’s thoughts, is, I will argue, crucial for the understanding 
of how self-reflection may amount to a correction of one’s attitudes.  
In this paper, I want to substantiate this concern by providing an alterna-
tive reconstruction of Kant’s view on self-knowledge. In highlighting this pas-
sive aspect of self-knowledge in Kant’s approach, I want to draw attention to an 
issue often neglected in philosophical debates about self-knowledge. If we re-
gard enlightenment as a real option for humans, then a philosophical model of 
human self-knowledge has to satisfy not just one, but two requirements. It must 
account for the first-personal nature of self-knowledge and it must do so in a 
way that makes it comprehensible how subjects may correct their epistemic or 
moral attitudes.  
I proceed in several steps. In sections one to three, I try to make room for 
the view that Kant allows for the notion of our becoming aware of our mental 
properties, including our thoughts, in a passive way. Starting with some prelim-
inary remarks on the textual evidence, I draw attention to two sets of interpre-
tive questions that every philosopher has to answer when proposing a Kantian 
style theory of self-knowledge. Sections two and three discuss Boyle’s answers 
to these questions and point out alternative ways of answering these two sets of 
question. It is against this background that I address my main interpretive ques-
|| 
1 It has to be emphasized that reference to a Kantian idea of self-constitution was used by 
many to overcome the rather conventionalist view of self-constitution featured in the 
“Wittgensteinian legacy” in Wright (1998). Besides Moran (2001), Bilgrami (2006) and Rödl 
(2007) offer versions of Kantian-style constitutionalist views on self-knowledge. It is, however, 
Boyle (2009) who most explicitly and carefully exposes what could be considered the “Kantian 
legacy” concerning the issue of self-constitution. The relation between self-consciousness and 
self-determination in Kant is also pointed out by Allison (2006).  
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tion in section four. How is it possible, according to Kant, that we sometimes 
come to know our thoughts in a passive way, and why does this matter? As can 
be shown by the famous reflection R 5655 on Whether it is an experience that we 
think, Kant does assume that we sometimes perceive a thought in a passive way, 
or through inner sense. I argue that this is not only consistent with the reading 
of Kant’s view on self-knowledge spelt out in section two and three, but it is, 
moreover, crucial to what one could call Kant’s second epistemological project, 
namely that of making processes of enlightenment conceivable. I end in section 
five by arguing that this perspective should be considered crucial for a philo-
sophical theory of self-knowledge. 
1  Two sets of interpretive questions 
As is well known, Kant did not present his views on self-knowledge in a sepa-
rate treatise. To reconstruct his account of self-knowledge, one has to rely on 
several remarks scattered among different texts, both published and un-
published. Unfortunately, these remarks do not provide a unified picture, but 
they suggest that Kant’s writings on self-knowledge can be divided in the same 
way his overall philosophy can be: into a pre-critical, a critical, and a late peri-
od.2 In what follows, I rely primarily on the views of the second period.  
There, Kant is mostly concerned with explicating and defending his distinc-
tion between two basic kinds of self-consciousness, named ‘pure apperception’ 
and ‘inner sense’.3 This emphasis is not surprising, for the distinction underlies 
|| 
2 The early views, which Kant held until as late as 1778, are contained in passages from the 
Lectures on Metaphysics and the Duisburger Nachlass; see Kitcher 2011, 66-77, for an analysis of 
them. Important texts for the critical period are the chapters on the Transcendental Deduction 
and the Paralogisms of pure Reason in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, § 46 of 
the Prolegomena, and §§ 1-7 and 24 in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. The late 
period is represented primarily by the passages on self-positing in the Opus postumum (primar-
ily fascicle VII and X). The posthumous manuscript On Inner Sense can be considered transi-
tional; it introduces a shift between the second and the third periods. See Klemme (1996, 5-17) 
and Zobrist (2011) for an analysis of the development of Kant’s views on the subject. 
3 Unlike in contemporary debate, where ‘self-knowledge’ is often used as co-extensional with 
or even equivalent to ‘self-consciousness’ or ‘self-awareness’, Kant draws a clear distinction 
between the two concepts such that self-consciousness, or rather the two kinds of self-
consciousness, is only a precondition of what he calls self-knowledge. The latter is distin-
guished from mere self-consciousness by the requirement that it has to satisfy Kant’s rather 
demanding conditions for a thought to count as knowledge. These differentiations are im-
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the arguments of some of most central passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
One could even say that, to some degree, it was his insight into the consequenc-
es of this distinction that forced Kant to revise the chapters on the Transcenden-
tal Deduction and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the second edition of the 
First Critique.4  
How is this distinction to be understood? To begin with, let us have a closer 
look at the passages in which the two conceptions of self-awareness are intro-
duced. Most crucial for the notion of transcendental apperception is the follow-
ing famous passage in § 16 of the B-Deduction, which says 
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something 
would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say 
that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for 
me.5 
The concept of inner sense, on the other hand, is introduced already in the 
Transcendental Aesthetics, where Kant says, 
Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, 
no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which 
the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the in-
ner determination is represented in relations of time.6 
The distinction between the two kinds of self-awareness, finally, is extensively 
discussed in both the Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms of Pure 
Reason, where Kant emphasizes several times that it is only in virtue of the tran-
scendental apperception that we can think of ourselves as the identical subject 
of our mental properties, whereas inner sense provides us only with an empiri-
|| 
portant for the point I am going to make; I am thus following Kant’s terminology rather strictly 
henceforth, though using ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘self-awareness’ interchangeably. 
4 See Horstmann 1993, Brook 2013, and Brandt 2013 for analysis and discussion of the differ-
ences between the two editions related to the issue of self-consciousness.  
5 „Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas 
in mir vorgestellt werden, was garnicht gedacht werden könnte, welches ebensoviel heißt, als 
die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein.“ (B 131f., the 
English translation quoted in the main text is from the edition by Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood.) 
6 „Der innere Sinn, vermittels dessen das Gemüt sich selbst, oder seinen inneren Zustand 
anschaut, gibt zwar keine Anschauung von der Seele selbst, als einem Objekt; allein es ist doch 
eine bestimmte Form, unter der die Anschauung ihres inneren Zustandes allein möglich ist, so 
daß alles, was zu den inneren Bestimmungen gehört, in Verhältnissen der Zeit vorgestellt 
wird.“ (B 37) 
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cal consciousness of ourselves insofar as we appear to ourselves. It is thus im-
possible for humans to have a notion of the I intuitively or, what amounts to the 
same idea, to perceive themselves as the subjects of their mental properties 
through inner sense. The overall picture in Kant’s critical philosophy is thus 
this: Kant assumes that, corresponding with the two sources of knowledge, 
there is a categorical distinction between two kinds of self-consciousness, each 
of which has a different function in both our epistemological and moral self-
reflection. 
While the general outlook seems clear, there are several issues with regard 
to which Kant’s approach is in need of further clarification. These may be divid-
ed into two sets of questions that one has to answer when interpreting Kant’s 
views on self-knowledge. First, one might wonder how to explicate the two 
notions of self-consciousness in detail. There is thus a first kind of interpretive 
concern exhibited by the following questions: 
(1) What kind of entity (or kinds of entities) does Kant refer to when he dis-
tinguishes the kind of self-consciousness contained in pure apperception from 
the kind provided through inner sense? Do these notions denote two distinct 
modes of representation involved in self-reflection only, or do they differentiate 
between two types of objects of human self-consciousness? Are there, moreover, 
strict correlations between modes of self-reflective representation and types of 
objects? Clearly, given the brief exposition above, there is one strict negative 
correlation: inner sense cannot possibly represent the I, the subject of mental 
properties as it is in itself. But what about the correlations between modes of 
self-reflective representation and different types of mental properties? Is there, 
for instance, a strict relationship between different modes of representation and 
types of mental properties such that it is only in virtue of pure apperception that 
one’s thoughts may be represented in self-reflection? Or is there room for con-
tingency with respect to how certain kinds of mental processes are represented 
in self-reflection? How, finally, is Kant’s emphasis on the difference between the 
activity of pure apperception and the experiential passivity through which we 
acquire self-knowledge in inner-sense to be understood? 
Note that all these questions are related to definitional issues. They arise 
because they are either not explicitly addressed by Kant himself, or because 
they are dealt with in a less than clear manner. But one cannot leave them un-
answered. Depending on how precisely they are answered, one may also ques-
tion whether or not there are only two kinds of self-reflexive representations in 
Kant. I will come to this issue in the next section. First, however, I would like to 
point to another set of interpretive questions, which are related to Kant’s con-
cept of knowledge. Given the different functions of pure apperception and inner 
sense, one can assume that there are some dependencies between the two kinds 
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of self-consciousness. Most famous is the suggestion in the sentence quoted 
above, that purely apperceptive self-consciousness is a necessary condition for 
all kinds of knowledge, including, of course, the kind of empirical self-
knowledge that consists in the categorization and determination of one’s own 
mental states. 
We may thus specify a second set of interpretive questions, which is con-
cerned with the relations between the two kinds of self-consciousness, pure 
apperception and inner-sense: 
(2) What kind of dependency is there between the two kinds of self-
consciousness, and how is it argued for? Is the primacy which Kant attributes to 
pure apperception in the Transcendental Deduction an expression of the epis-
temological program pursued in the First Critique, or is it a requirement of his 
conception of the human mind? Is it, in other words, due to Kant’s transcenden-
tal idealism, or is it a consequence of Kant’s view of the mind as having different 
ontological layers such that the existence of self-consciousness through inner 
sense is conditioned by the existence of purely apperceptive self-consciousness? 
If the latter, what exactly is required by this claim? What does “existence” mean 
in this context? Must a subject, in order to have some inner-sense experience, 
actually perform an act of pure apperception, or is it sufficient that she have the 
capacity for this kind of self-consciousness?7 Finally, is this primacy the only 
relation Kant assumes between these two kinds of self-consciousness? 
It is not obvious how Kant would have answered all these questions. Both 
sets of questions have aroused exegetic controversies.8 Since I am concerned 
with the issue of self-knowledge, I am primarily interested in the theoretical 
options related to these questions. The controversies surrounding Kant’s actual 
views on these issues show, I think, that there are more possibilities for theoret-
ical differentiation than is often assumed. These might turn out to be relevant 
for the debate about self-knowledge as well. I will discuss this at greater length 
in the rest of this paper. At this point, I only want to mention my major concern: 
|| 
7 I follow here Emundts (2013), who has recently distinguished between two readings of Kant’s 
notion of self-knowledge through pure apperception, i.e. a reading according to which Kant is 
merely referring to our faculty of thinking, and a reading which takes self-knowledge through 
pure apperception to consist in some kind of actual consciousness. Albeit crucial, this distinc-
tion is only rarely explicitly discussed. As I am going to point out, this is also the case in 
Boyle’s defense of Moran. In contrast to Emundts, however, I am not primarily interested in 
providing a true interpretation of Kant’s views. Instead, I make use of her distinction in order to 
point out different types of broadly Kantian theories of self-knowledge.  
8 See Emundts (2013b, 52f.) for controversies surrounding the first set of questions, 
Horstmann (2013) for those surrounding the second set of questions.  
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I am worried that in recent debates on self-knowledge, the focus on self-
constitution leads to the subject’s activity in achieving self-knowledge being 
overemphasized, while those aspects of self-consciousness and self-reflection 
that are irreducibly passive are marginalized or even misunderstood. To see 
how Kant deals with the above questions may help to understand why and in 
what respect passivity matters. 
2  Varieties of self-representation 
As already mentioned, Boyle’s primary goal in referencing Kant is not to engage 
in an exegesis of Kant’s arguments, but to put Moran’s notion of deliberative 
self-knowledge into a broader framework. In doing so, Boyle provides a new 
interpretation of the Kantian dichotomy between pure apperception and inner 
sense, according to which this dichotomy is introduced to distinguish between 
two forms of self-knowledge, an active and a passive form of self-knowledge. 
Kant’s intuition behind this move consists, Boyle suggests, in the assumption 
that only a mind capable of active self-knowledge, of thinking of oneself as the 
maker of one’s thought, is also capable of passively receiving some representa-
tion of its own occurrent mental states in inner sense. In emphasizing this de-
pendency between the two kinds of self-knowledge, Boyle takes Kant’s affirma-
tion of the priority of pure apperception to be constitutive of what may be called 
a mature human mind. Being self-knowers, mature human minds are subjects 
who have an understanding of the concepts involved in their judgments or atti-
tudes, and this requires that they are able to form judgments or adopt attitudes 
on the basis of rational deliberation. On the other hand, subjects lacking such 
an understanding of concepts cannot even legitimately be considered knowers.9 
How does this interpretation respond to the questions raised in the previous 
section? As to the first set of questions, Boyle’s view seems to be that the distinc-
tion between pure apperception and inner sense sets apart both modes of 
presentation and types of objects of human self-knowledge. Correspondingly, 
|| 
9 Following this picture of Kant, the crucial point of Moran’s notion of self-constitution lies in 
the conception of the human or rational mind provided thereby and not in the description he 
gives of the process of self-knowledge. It is in virtue of being able to take a deliberative stance 
towards one’s own attitudes that humans are rational subjects. This is surely an adequate and 
charitable picture of Moran’s contention, as can be shown by the fact that Moran himself ap-
peals to Kant more than once in order to clarify the point of his distinction between the stance 
of causal explanation and the stance of rational agency; cf. Moran (2001, 89 and 127).  
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he assumes that there is a strict correlation between modes of self-
representation and objects, such that mental activities are the objects of the 
active mode of representation, whereas passively acquired mental states have to 
be represented passively. He thus ascribes to Kant the view that we know our 
thoughts exclusively through pure apperception, whereas our sensations and 
emotions are known through inner sense.  
Relying on this view, we may also explicate Boyle’s answers to the second 
set of questions. In accordance with the assumption of a strict correlation be-
tween modes of presentation and objects of self-reflection, Boyle seems to sug-
gest that the primacy of pure apperception as maintained in the Transcendental 
Deduction is a matter of the constitution of mature human minds. For a subject 
to be a mature human mind, it is necessary that it have the capacity for pure 
apperception or, as the parallel with Moran’s approach suggests, for rational 
deliberation of one’s attitudes. This also suggests that man’s capacity for inner 
sense is shaped by his capacity for pure apperception without, however, being 
reducible to it. Boyle thus seems to read Kant’s claim of the primacy of pure 
apperception as an anthropological tenet based on a dependency relation be-
tween two kinds of capacities rather than actual exercises of these capacities.10  
Boyle’s reconstruction of Kant is very clear, and it is characterized moreover 
by articulate commitments. He explicitly argues that the decisive contrast be-
tween the two kinds of self-knowledge is a matter of capacities and not of 
occurrent uses of the capacities, and he obviously adopts an anthropological 
rather than an epistemological reading of Kant. One might wonder, however, 
whether this does not hide some of the complexities of Kant’s views. There is in 
particular one point at which Boyle’s exposition departs substantially from 
Kant’s own articulation of his account. Explaining the distinction between pure 
apperception and inner sense, Boyle draws on some formulations of Kant ap-
pearing in § 24 of the Anthropology. There Kant says:  
Der innere Sinn ist nicht die reine Apperception, ein Bewußtsein dessen, was der Mensch 
thut, denn dieses gehört zum Denkungsvermögen, sondern was er leidet, wiefern er durch 
sein eignes Gedankenspiel afficirt wird (AA 7: 161).  
Boyle renders this passage as follows: 
|| 
10 The idea that this dependency relation is essential to the nature of human subjects is also 
maintained by Kitcher. In contrast to Boyle, however, she emphasizes that this dependency is 
not merely a matter of capacities, but of activities: “Absent the activities involved in judging 
and inferring, humans would remain in a state of being potential thinking selves; it is only the 
exercise of these capacities that creates the relations among mental states that are distinctive of 
cognitive subjects and that permit them to understand themselves as ‘I’s” (Kitcher 2011, 264f.). 
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Kant says: that whereas our apperceptive knowledge of our own judgments is a 
knowledge of ‘what we do [thun]’, our knowledge of our sensations and appetites through 
inner sense is a knowledge of what we ‘undergo [leiden].’  
In the next sentence he recalls this passage by referring to the “Kantian contrast 
between an active and a passive form of self-knowledge” (Boyle 2009, 158). 
This is not precisely what Kant says. First, Kant is not explaining the notion 
of inner sense in terms of our awareness of sensations and appetites; he doesn’t 
even mention our sensations and appetites in this paragraph. Instead, he 
equates pure apperception with man’s consciousness of what he does, and he 
contrasts this with his awareness of what he undergoes insofar as he is affected 
by the play of his own thought. Note that Kant uses the terminology of thought 
in both formulations: pure apperception belongs to the capacity of thought, but 
what we undergo is also an instance of thought, or of the play of our own 
thought. Taking this seriously, we have to conclude that Kant’s concept of 
thought allows for two options that are missed in Boyle’s paraphrase of the 
quoted text. First, we can be affected by our thought or by the results of our 
thinking activity; second, it must be possible for these to be known in a passive 
way.  
There is another peculiarity in Boyle’s exposition. In the text mentioned 
above, Kant indeed contrasts passivity and activity, but only at level of the ob-
jects of self-consciousness. This is not equivalent to the contrast “between an 
active and a passive form [emphasis U.R.] of self-knowledge”, as Boyle puts it. 
This is not to say that Kant does not sometimes distinguish pure apperception 
and inner sense by characterizing the first as an active and the second as a pas-
sive form of self-consciousness. But so far as I can see, he is not strictly correlat-
ing consciousness of what we do with an active, and self-consciousness of what 
we undergo with a passive, form of self-reflection.  
But, one might say, isn’t this correlation involved in Kant’s categorical de-
nial that inner sense is able to represent the I or the subject of one’s mental 
properties? I don’t think so. Clearly, given this denial, I cannot endorse some 
instance of my activity as mine by perceiving it through inner sense. But this 
neither entails that I am unable to sense instances of thought as mental states I 
am undergoing, nor does it preclude that I am perceiving these through inner 
sense. On the contrary, it seems hard to make sense of the idea that we can be 
affected by the play of our thoughts and be aware of this by inner sense if these 
options were ruled out. 
This indicates that Kant’s approach contains more theoretical differentia-
tions than one might think if one focuses simply on the distinction between an 
active and a passive form of self-consciousness. We have to presume that the 
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dichotomy between activity and passivity is applied to both the objects and the 
forms of reflective representation. This allows us to combine the types of mental 
capacities or processes constituting the object of self-reflection with the modes 
of representing them in self-reflection in several ways. This can best be illustrat-
ed by the following cross classification: 
 
object
 
mode of 
representation
active
  
passive
 
active (1) taking a stance 
towards some 
thought  
(2) taking a stance 
towards some 
 feeling or sensation  
passive (3) perceiving my be-
ing affected by 
some thought11 
(4) perceiving my be-
ing affected by 
some feeling or 
sensation 
 
Following this classification, there are at least four options for how humans 
may self-consciously represent their own minds: (1) they can take a stance to-
wards some thought; e.g. by actively affirming or denying it; (2) they can take a 
stance towards some sensation or emotion; e.g. by actively approve or condemn 
it; (3) they can perceive their being affected by some thought; e.g. by stating its 
occurrence; and (4) they can perceive their being affected by some sensation or 
feeling; e.g. by just noting it.  
Note that these examples are only meant to illustrate the distinctions in 
question; they are mine and not Kant’s. It has to be admitted furthermore that 
not all the options are of the same importance in Kant’s transcendental philoso-
phy. It is not clear, for instance, whether (2) plays any significant role in the 
First Critique, and if so, on which level. Also, one might wonder whether the 
claim that “[t]he I think must accompany all my representations” refers to (1) 
only or to (1) and (3) together. But this is not to say that Kant did not develop his 
views against the background of the full spectrum of possibilities as depicted by 
|| 
11 Yoon Choi has raised the question of whether the content of the perception includes “my 
being affected” by the thought or the sensation. I think it contains my “being affected,” which 
is ipso facto “my being affected” but definitely not “me being affected”. 
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this classification, on the contrary. I will argue in the last section that there are 
at least good reasons to assume that (3) plays an important role for Kant as well. 
3  The primacy of pure apperception 
As previously mentioned, Boyle is committed to a reading of Kant that assumes 
some categorical dependency of inner sense on pure apperception at the level of 
man’s mental capacities. The argument for this assumption is provided by what 
Boyle describes as a minimal condition for self-knowledge. According to this 
requirement, every subject capable of knowing herself must have the capacity 
to represent her own condition as being of a certain kind (Boyle 2009, 143 and 
161). Otherwise we (and she) would not be able to understand what makes the 
object of self-knowledge a self (Boyle 2009, 161). This minimal condition for self-
knowledge parallels Moran’s notion of authoritative self-knowledge: A subject 
is capable of representing her own condition if and only if she is able to take a 
deliberative stance towards her attitudes. At the same time, this minimal condi-
tion is used to explain Kant’s claim that all our empirical consciousness con-
tained in inner sense is conditioned by the consciousness of the I provided by 
pure apperception.  
This does indeed capture an important point. Kant does assume that in pure 
apperception we do not simply contemplate our mental states and activities, but 
actively exercise our capacity to combine representations and thereby affirm 
our authority or, in Kant’s terms, our spontaneity which we have in virtue of 
being the makers of our thoughts. Furthermore, the awareness of our being the 
makers of our thoughts is indeed what constitutes the essence of the self. “[T]he 
I”, Kant says in the paralogisms, “is only the consciousness of my thinking” (B 
413); here thereby denies any substantial self.  
I nonetheless think that the point behind Kant’s central claim in § 16 of the 
B-Deduction (B 136) that it must be possible for the I think to accompany all my 
representations is different than Boyle’s anthropological interpretation sug-
gests. There are two valid readings of this sentence, to my mind. One says that 
wherever my representations originate from, none of them can constitute an 
objective thought unless I can accompany it by the thought ‘I think’. What is 
required, according to this interpretation, is not the capacity for pure appercep-
tion as such, but the capacity for accompanying the particular representations 
in question by some act of apperception. Given this first reading, Kant’s concern 
in emphasizing the dependency of all our representations on pure apperception 
is not simply whether we have a certain cognitive ability, but whether a repre-
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sentation is available to us in a sufficiently clear and distinct form such that it 
can be picked out in an act of thought.12 Otherwise, I am not in the position to 
use it within the formation of some judgment. The second reading departs even 
further from Boyle’s suggestion. It says that a representation received in inner 
sense cannot constitute an objective thought in the absence of that self-
consciousness which is constituted by the activity of pure apperception. Given 
this interpretation, any instance of self-knowledge requires that we actually 
have the relevant self-consciousness. I do not want to decide here which of the-
se readings is true. Yet according to both these readings, Kant’s point is more 
specific than Boyle’s anthropological reconstruction suggests. Both relate the 
sentence in §16 of the B-Deduction to the epistemological program of the First 
Critique, which aims to explicate the conditions of our knowledge of unified 
objects. Unlike Boyle’s account, these readings do not ascribe to Kant a particu-
lar conception of the human mind.13  
Given the epistemological program of the First Critique, both of these read-
ings are, I think, preferable to Boyle’s anthropological reconstruction, for they 
suggest a reading of B 136 that allows for the explanation of the primacy of pure 
apperception, which Kant asserts here, as the expression of the epistemic func-
tion of the latter. This is not to say that the kind of self-consciousness provided 
by pure apperception has not in fact an enormous anthropological relevance for 
Kant.14 Nonetheless, it seems more appropriate to assume that the primacy 
claim which Kant is making in the transcendental deduction has to do with the 
role of pure apperception in constituting objective knowledge.15  
To conclude, we can say that there is no need to ascribe to Kant the psycho-
logical view that any instance of human self-awareness is dependent on our 
being capable of pure apperception. This is an anthropological tenet one may 
attribute to him, but it is by no means necessary to make sense of Kant’s claim 
that in the constitution of objective knowledge, pure apperception has some 
primacy over inner sense. If, on the other hand, we accept that this primacy 
claim is related to Kant’s epistemological concerns, then we may look for an 
|| 
12 This interpretation can be affirmed by the way Kant re-interprets the rationalist terminology 
of clear and distinct ideas in §§ 5 & 6 of his Anthropology.  
13 In reconstructing this program, we should abstain also from explicating the activity of pure 
apperception in terms of adopting propositional attitudes.  
14 For this, see §1 of the Anthropology, where Kant draws attention to the radical change in a 
subject’s consciousness that occurs the moment a subject starts using the word ‘I’. 
15 It is not surprising, against this background, that the more Kant is interested in man’s 
abilities to represent his own mind, the more he focuses on inner sense and its variations. Cf. in 
particular the Anthropology and the late manuscript On Inner Sense. 
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alternative way to make use of Kant’s views on self-reflection, which attributes 
more importance to the passivity involved in man’s becoming aware of his men-
tal properties. 
4  The possibility of reflective experience 
Let me now recall the final question of the second set of interpretive issues spec-
ified in section one. Is the primacy of pure apperception, I asked, the only rela-
tion Kant assumes between the two kinds of self-consciousness? Given the vari-
eties of self-representations exposed in section two and given, in particular, the 
option that we can be affected by the play of our thoughts and become aware of 
this in a passive way, the answer must be ‘no’. There must be a sense in which 
an instance of our thought can be felt or perceived by inner sense, even if it 
originated from an act of pure apperception. Kant must, in other words, allow 
that there is a passive way to become aware of one’s thought, which in turn 
amounts to a more robust kind of self-knowledge.  
The question might arise whether this is consistent with Kant’s attributing 
epistemic primacy to pure apperception over inner sense. How can we make 
sense of the notion that we come to know our own thoughts in a passive way 
without undermining this primacy claim? 
Kant does not address this issue at length, but we can get an idea of how he 
would have addressed it if we take a closer look at his famous reflection, R 5655, 
entitled Beantwortung der Frage, ob es eine Erfahrung ist, dass wir denken (AA 
18, 318-20). Is it, the question he is discussing here asks, an experience that we 
think? Kant begins by clarifying the usage of his notion of ‘experience’, which 
he relates to his concepts of ‘perception’ and of ‘aesthetic comprehension’. We 
do not have an experience, he says, when we are conscious of some representa-
tion, but only a perception. Yet, if we come to grasp or comprehend some mani-
fold perceived in one unified representation, then we do have an empirical cog-
nition of an object, and our judgment expressing this cognition does in fact 
correspond to an experience.  
Kant thus defines experience as the judgment affirming an empirical cogni-
tion, which is in turn constituted by the unification of some representation pro-
vided by the senses. Having established this definition, he goes on, in the se-
cond paragraph, to reject the idea that mere consciousness of one’s thoughts 
could possibly constitute experience. Clearly, given the aforementioned concep-
tion of experience, neither the imagination of an object nor the having of a cer-
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tain thought amounts to an experience. This can be generalized: imagination 
and consciousness just aren’t forms of experience for Kant.  
So far, this text consists in a mere elucidation of Kant’s concept of experi-
ence. In the third paragraph, however, Kant suggests a rather unusual applica-
tion of this concept, which has some striking implications. After reaffirming that 
to have an experience requires that one receives some representation from the 
senses, he claims that even a thought lacking perceptual content may result in 
an experience if some further and, I think, reflective step is added. Considered 
as affections or ‘determinations’ of the mind (‘Gemüth’ in German), thoughts 
can be perceived as temporal events which I undergo or as temporal states to 
which my mind is subjected. Even my thoughts are therefore observable in in-
ner sense and may constitute the content, or in Kant’s terminology, the materi-
al, of an empirical cognition.  
Note that this view implicitly relies on the options pointed out in section 
two: that, first of all, we can be affected by the products of our capacity for 
thought; and, secondly, that we can perceive this in a passive way. However, in 
elaborating this idea of reflexive experience in R 5655, Kant goes even further. 
He claims that any thought we have, whether its content is empirical or merely 
imaginative, may, when considered as a mental event and observed in inner 
sense, bring about an empirical cognition which, in turn, when approved by 
some judgment, results in an experience. Kant’s answer to the question whether 
it is an experience that we think is thus this: Although the concept of experience 
as established in his epistemology is not straight away applicable to our con-
sciously held thoughts, it is nonetheless possible for us to make an experience 
on the basis of a thought we have, namely, if we, through a process of reflec-
tion, come to see and acknowledge that the thought in question is indeed one 
we have been entertaining.16  
|| 
16 Kitcher (2011, 173-175) has developed an alternative interpretation of this Reflection which 
denies that the possibility of reflecting on mental events in inner sense is an option for Kant. 
Her interpretation relies on a particular reading of the second half of the following sentence: 
“The thought [thinking] itself, although it occurs in time, takes no regard of time when the 
properties of a figure are to be thought.” According to Kitcher, Kant is thinking here of the 
necessity of an enduring consciousness throughout the combined representation in thought. 
Whether this is really necessary has been challenged recently by Rosefeldt (2014). My point is 
different: it seems to me that Kant is thinking of the atemporal properties of the objects or 
contents of thought, rather than of some putative atemporal character of the process of 
thought. Furthermore, I have some difficulties with understanding Kitcher’s assumption that 
processes of conscious combining cannot be given any temporal determination. To be sure, 
given her account, we have to keep in mind the first representation to be combined during the 
whole process of combining. We thus cannot say that the first representation occurs at a par-
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I would now like to return to the question raised above: How can we make 
sense of Kant’s assumption that we may sometimes become aware of our own 
thoughts in a passive way without undermining the claim that pure appercep-
tion has some kind of epistemic primacy?  
Keeping in mind what Kant says in R 5655 about the possibility of making 
an experience by means of reflecting on the affections of our mind, we are now 
in the position to suggest a preliminary answer to this. We have to recall, first of 
all, that inner sense is characterized also as that form of intuition by which we 
perceive appearances as temporal items (cf. B 37 and B 49f.). Kant himself re-
hearses this view in R 5655 when he says that any experience, even if it is to 
represent some atemporal truth, is necessarily correlated with some temporal 
determination. In having an experience, he says, “I am passive and feel myself 
affected according to the formal condition of the inner sense” (AA 18, 319).  
We can conclude that it seems possible on the Kantian theory to look at eve-
ry thought or judgment from two sides and to adopt either an atemporal or a 
temporal perspective on it. To illustrate this, let us assume that I affirm the vis-
ual appearance of some lines as configuring a clear and distinct representation 
of a triangle. I am aware of this appearance and approve it, in an act of pure 
apperception. I thereby affirm that it is representing a triangle, disregarding the 
fact that I perceive the lines at a particular time. But I can of course take a step 
back and look at the mental state I am having when approving this appearance 
as representing a triangle. I will then observe this act of pure apperception as a 
particular mental episode, and this involves being aware of it as affecting my 
mind at a certain time. Kant thus seems to adopt some kind of aspect dualism 
according to which every instance of thought can either be regarded and af-
firmed as holding independently of any temporal restriction, or perceived as a 
temporal event.17  
|| 
ticular moment of the process of combining. Yet, this is not to say that the whole process can-
not be assigned a determinate time, but only that, internally, it has to be structured holistical-
ly, rather than as sequence of temporal events. However, I agree with Kitcher about one point: 
It is hard to see how Kant’s notion of inner sense can account for the phenomena she has in 
mind. This indicates that Kant’s notion of inner sense is theoretically under-developed, but 
not, as she sometimes seems to suggest, that it has no role to play. 
17 The question might arise whether it is not crucial that one and the same subject can adopt 
both perspectives at the same time. Is it not necessary for Kant’s views on the possibility of 
knowledge that we can, at the same time, both perform an act of pure apperception and per-
ceive it as now occurring? This is how I read the emphasis of Henrich 1988, Horstmann 2013 
and Emundts 2007 and 2013 that pure apperception is typically some kind of occurrent con-
sciousness. I do not take a position on this question now. What seems more important to me 
here is to emphasize that these two perspectives necessarily complement each other. They 
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Now, to safeguard the epistemic primacy of pure apperception over inner 
sense, these two perspectives cannot be on the same footing; otherwise they 
would mutually neutralize each other. They must be attributed different theoret-
ical functions.18 This is indeed what we find in Kant. The two perspectives ex-
press, as it were, different concerns of Kant’s philosophy. That we can take an 
atemporal perspective towards all our representations and approve them by an 
act of pure apperception is a necessary condition of there being mental states 
that count as objective knowledge. The first perspective is thus absolutely cru-
cial for Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The case is quite different if, one the 
other hand, we want to examine how it is possible for human subjects to im-
prove their outlook on the world by means of philosophical reflection. To ad-
dress this question, we must be able to consider our thoughts as mental events 
which are affecting us or have been affecting us. This requires that we adopt the 
second perspective. 
That we can know of our thoughts in a passive way may thus seem unnec-
essary for Kant’s primary epistemological project, which is to exhibit the condi-
tions of the possibility of objective knowledge. But it is, I contend, necessary for 
another project of his, namely to show that human minds are able to overcome a 
certain kind of error by means of reflective self-scrutiny. That we can perceive a 
certain thought as a mental state we have been maintaining so far is necessarily 
connected with the idea that enlightenment is a possibility for human beings. 
5  Self-correction and the requirement for a 
philosophical conception of self-knowledge  
I have shown in this paper that, in contrast to what self-constitutionalist inter-
pretations allege, there is, according to Kant, a way in which we passively be-
come aware of our thoughts. Furthermore, I have argued that, while this possi-
bility may be neglected when Kant’s views on knowledge are at stake, it is a 
crucial epistemic prerequisite of his conviction that human beings are capable 
for enlightenment. 
|| 
exhibit different aspects of our mental life, and it is not possible that one may replace the other. 
They cannot possibly be adopted with regard to the very same aspect of the same item. Wheth-
er it is possible for a subject to adopt them at one and the same time is secondary. 
18 This insight goes back to a discussion I had with Richard Moran and Matthew Boyle on a 
previous version of this text. I am very much indebted to them.  
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The question might arise why this is relevant for a theory of self-knowledge. 
Clearly, it is not immediately relevant for the issue that is often discussed in 
contemporary philosophical debates about self-knowledge: first person authori-
ty. The kind of reflective experience discussed in the preceding pages does in-
volve first-person authority, but its analysis does nothing to clarify how, accord-
ing to Kant, first-person authority is to be understood. For this question, it 
would suffice to look at conceptions of pure apperception and of inner sense.  
However, when we explore the history of philosophy, we see that discus-
sion of self-knowledge has never been restricted to issue of first person authori-
ty. Instead, philosophers have often been concerned with self-knowledge for 
reasons similar to those that motivate Kant’s interest in the idea of reflective 
experience: accounting for the possibility of enlightenment. In more general 
terms, self-knowledge matters because it is related to the capacity of human 
beings to recognize their mistakes and to correct their epistemic or moral atti-
tudes. Much more can be said about this on both phenomenological and epis-
temological levels. In this paper, I have just argued that to keep enlightenment 
a real option for humanity presupposes that we can become aware of our 
thoughts in a passive way.  
The problem with self-constitutionalism is that this option is neglected, or 
even undermined, notwithstanding the declared interest of self-constitutionalists 
in epistemic self-determination. To illustrate why self-constitutionalism cannot 
do the job, let us have a look at the following example. In my daily life as a 
teacher of philosophy, it often happens that I am confronted with the fact that I 
have had mistaken views about a student. Let us assume that I realize that I 
have been wrong in my judgment that a certain student is disinterested in logic. 
The crucial question is: What are the preconditions that allow for such an in-
sight?  
Without explicating this in detail, we can state that such an insight involves 
at least two cognitive acts. On the one hand, I have to identify the notion that 
the student is disinterested in logic as a thought I have been entertaining so far. 
On the other hand, I have to deny that the student is disinterested in logics. 
Having distinguished these two acts, it becomes quite clear that the precondi-
tions for my being in the position to acknowledge the wrongness of my former 
judgment are quite complex. It is not sufficient that I adopt a certain stance 
towards what is presumably the truth about the student’s interest in logic. In 
addition, I must be able to know what I have in fact have maintained until very 
recently.  
Now, while the possibility of my taking a stance towards some presumed 
truth may well be accounted for by self-constitutionalism, this is not the case 
with respect to the other act, the perception of myself as having been in a state 
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of mind which I now judge as wrong. To acknowledge that I have been wrong, 
in my view, requires that I can be aware of a thought in a way that does not 
involve actual endorsement.  
We can conclude that either we allow for the kind of reflective experience 
discussed above and, hence, for the possibility of a passive way of becoming 
aware of our thoughts, or we have to deny that it may ever happen that we cor-
rect our own judgments in the way just sketched. I think this is definitely too 
high a price to pay, especially for a philosopher; it would undermine nothing 
less than the very possibility of enlightenment. It is against this background 
that I am calling for a new kind of approach to the concept of self-knowledge in 
philosophy, which is not concerned solely with the issue of first person authori-
ty, but also helps us understand the possibility of enlightenment, or, in other 
words, the capacity of humans to recognize their mistakes and correct them by 
self-reflection.19 
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